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Abstract
This Article examines the tension between the independence of judges in the CIT and the role
of stare decisis in the CIT. After an overview of the applicability of the doctrine at the trial court
level, the Article will set out two case studies in CIT decision making. The first example, relating
to the standard to be applied by the Commission in preliminary antidumping and countervailing
duty investigations, is a “worst case scenario” in which judicial inconsistency has caused a great
deal of confusion for the Commission and its individual commissioners. The second example,
which involves a series of cases relating to the proper role of economic or elasticity analysis in
Commission injury determinations, shows how a cogent and consistent body of law has emerged
on an issue when the judges of the CIT have taken into account prior decisions and have care-
fully built upon them in subsequent opinions. Finally, this Article addresses, in light of the two
examples, what balance if any may be struck between judicial independence and the application
of precedent in CIT review of antidumping and countervailing duty investigations.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most frequent and, perhaps, most intractable
questions relating to practice before the U.S. Court of Interna-
tional Trade (the "CIT") concerns the role of precedent, or
stare decisis, in the litigation of antidumping and counter-
vailing duty cases. The topic has elicited considerable com-
ment over the last several years from both government counsel
and members of the private bar. Like the application of stare
decisis by the CIT, the debate over the application of prece-
dent has been characterized by indistinct boundaries between
the positions. Two lines of thought, however, have emerged in
the course of comment on the question.
On the one hand, some practitioners hold the view that
"[f]rom the perspective of the agencies ... the present absence
of certainty in the administration of the law argues for a
stricter interpretation of the effect of stare decisis on subse-
quent decisions of the court."' Moreover, in light of the bur-
t This Article is adapted from a paper submitted to the Sixth Annual Judicial
Conference of the U.S. Court of International Trade on November 3, 1989. The
views expressed in this Article are solely those of its Authors and do not represent
the views of the U.S. International Trade Commission or its members. The Authors
wish to acknowledge the assistance of Katherine A. Traxler of the UCLA School of
Law in the research and preparation of this Article.
* Assistant General Counsel for Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investi-
gations, U.S. International Trade Commission.
* * Attorney-Adviser, U.S. International Trade Commission.
1. Powell & Concannon, Stare Decisis in the Court of International Trade: One Court or
Many?, U.S. TRADE L. & PoLIcy 351, 374 (Nov. 24, 1986). Powell and Concannon
explore the development of stare decisis in the federal courts in general, and the U.S.
Court of International Trade (the "CIT") in particular, with an eye to its role in
review of antidumping and countervailing duty investigations. They analyze the use
of precedent in the context of decisions evaluating the U.S. Department of Com-
merce's application of the "specificity test," the requirement that countervailable
subsidies are those "provided to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enter-
prises or industries, whether publicly or privately owned, and whether paid or be-
stowed directly or indirectly on the manufacture, production, or export of any class
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geoning number of CIT cases involving similar antidumping
and countervailing duty issues, private parties, as well as the
U.S. Department of Commerce and the U.S. International
Trade Commission (the "Commission"), depend on the CIT
to provide a clear and consistent guide for future conduct. 2
Otherwise, it has been urged, the administration of the law is
adversely affected by inconsistent decisions, and private parties
must resort to unnecessary appeals to lay a particular issue to
rest. Such problems cannot, it is argued, be remedied by a
"peripatetic" view of stare decisis by the CIT.
On the other hand, some parties intimate that what may
be perceived as inconsistency in the positions of various judges
of the CIT may represent nothing more than a "period of re-
finement" of the CIT's position with respect to a particular is-
sue.4 From this perspective, inconsistency among judges of
the CIT with respect to a particular issue tends to be cast in
terms of developing law or a period of "tighter analysis" by the
CIT of the application of a standard to the facts of a given
case.5 Commentators adopting this view of stare decisis tend
to give a "tip of the hat" to the notion, pointing out that con-
flicts and lack of consistency among various decisions create
confusion and offer the affected agency an "out" to nonacqui-
escence.6 Nonetheless, those who adopt this viewpoint main-
or kind of merchandise." 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(5)(A)(ii) (Supp. 1990). Powell and
Concannon discuss a series of apparently inconsistent CIT decisions that use this
test, highlighting the problems such lack of consistency pose for the agency and the
private litigants. They urge careful examination of precedent and enhanced consid-
eration of three-judge panels for issues of fundamental importance to "lend credence
to the Court in the development of the law and speed resolution of controversial
issues." Powell & Concannon, supra, at 402-03.
2. Powell & Concannon, supra note 1, at 401.
3. Id. at 401-02.
4. Cameron & Russo, Recent Trends in the Application of Stare Decisis by the Court of
International Trade, COMMERCE DEP'T SPEAKS 547, 551 (July 27, 1987). Cameron and
Russo note that "because of the existence of conflicting decisions from the individual
judges, the Department [of Commerce] and private parties did not have clear instruc-
tion on the court's position on this issue." Id. at 570. They further note that stare
decisis would have prevented the need to relitigate the issue as if it were before the
CIT for the first time, thereby allowing the CIT to resolve a case with more speed
and consistency. Id. at 577. At the same time as they urge closer review of precedent
by the CIT, Cameron and Russo believe that the application of precedent should not
obviate the flexibility necessary to deal with unique variations in antidumping and
countervailing duty cases. Id. at 579-80.
5. Id.
6. See id. at 551. The Cameron and Russo article indicates that the lack of prece-
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tain that "[t]he trade laws, and in particular the countervailing
duty law, often address complex government and corporate
transactions and relationships" and that "a single policy or
legal standard does not easily resolve the myriad of circum-
stances these cases regularly contain."7 Underpinning this line
of thought is the idea that rigid adherence to the doctrine of
stare decisis may eliminate the flexibility to decide whether "an
established rule needs to bend," thus rendering the CIT's de-
cisions "mechanical and essentially blind to the variations of
issues inherent in this area of the law.
' '
The hallmark of the discussion over the proper role to be
accorded stare decisis, then, has been not so much a question
of whether the CIT should apply precedent but the degree to
which it should do so. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit, however, recently moved the debate back to its
most basic level. In affirming the CIT's decision in Algoma Steel
Corp. v. United States,9 the court addressed the appellants' con-
tention that the judge of the CIT erred in not following the
earlier decisions of a judge of the Customs Court, the prede-
cessor of the CIT.'0 The Federal Circuit flatly rejected this no-
tion, pointing out that
among trial courts it is unusual for one judge to be bound
by the decisions of another and, if it is to occur, su'ch a rule
should be stated somewhere. That is not done here; with all
the criticism directed by appellants towards Judge Restani
for not following Judge Newman, nowhere is anything
pointed out saying she must .... [Sihe is right in making her
own decision. "
Thus, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit firmly
dential effect has led, in some measure, to nonacquiescence by the agency in particu-
lar decisions of the CIT with which it disagrees. Id. at 572 (citing suspension agree-
ment in Certain Red Raspberries from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 1005, 1007 (Jan. 9,
1986)). Specifically, Cameron and Russo assert that the U.S. Department of Com-
merce refused to follow a ruling in Cabot Corp. v. United States, 788 F.2d 1539 (Fed.
Cir. 1986), on the question of general availability. Cameron & Russo, supra note 4, at
571-72.
7. Cameron & Russo, supra note 4, at 576.
8. Id. at 577-78.
9. 865 F.2d 240, 243 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3244 (1989).
10. Id. at 242 (noting that "[a]ppellant seeks to discredit the opinion of the trial
court by citation and discussion of a decision by Judge Newman of that court").
11. Id. at 243 (emphasis added).
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endorsed the fundamental concept of independent decision
making among the judges of the CIT.
Does the decision of the Federal Circuit in Algoma Steel sig-
nify that judicial decision making in the CIT should take place
with total disregard for the opinions of other judges on the
same issue? Of course not, although the degree to which those
prior decisions should or may be taken into account is still a
matter of ambiguity. The concerns expressed by those respec-
tively favoring greater or lesser reliance on precedent remain.
The lack of consistency often attendant upon greater indepen-
dence of judicial thought does produce confusion for the par-
ties and for the agencies administering the antidumping and
countervailing duty laws. This inevitably results in relitigation
of particular issues in order to obtain a definitive decision, and
then only after resort to subsequent appeal to the Federal Cir-
cuit. 12 Moreover, the affected agency, having litigated a partic-
ular issue in several cases, must struggle to fit its practice
within an inconsistent judicial framework that may offer only
two choices. If the choice selected by the agency does not
comport with the alternative argued by a party, then the accu-
sation of nonacquiescence is made. However, because of the
complex and case-specific nature of antidumping and counter-
vailing duty investigations, a lockstep approach to the applica-
tion of precedent by the CIT would deprive the CIT of the
flexibility necessary to decision making in this area of the law.
This Article examines the tension between the indepen-
dence of judges in the CIT and the role of stare decisis in the
CIT. After an overview of the applicability of the doctrine at
the trial court level, the Article will set out two case studies in
CIT decision making. The first example, relating to the stan-
dard to be applied by the Commission in preliminary an-
tidumping and countervailing duty investigations, is a "worst
case scenario" in which judicial inconsistency has caused a
great deal of confusion for the Commission and its individual
commissioners. The second example, which involves a series
of cases relating to the proper role of economic or elasticity
analysis in Commission injury determinations, shows how a co-
12. As we shall see, however, a decision of the Federal Circuit does not neces-
sarily end the debate in the CIT. See infra notes 52-120 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Yuasa problem).
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gent and consistent body of law has emerged on an issue when
the judges of the CIT have taken into account prior decisions
and have carefully built upon them in subsequent opinions. Fi-
nally, this Article addresses, in light of the two examples, what
balance if any may be struck between judicial independence
and the application of precedent in CIT review of antidumping
and countervailing duty investigations.
I. STARE DECISIS AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF TRIAL
COURT JUDGES
As a general proposition, stare decisis describes the effect
of prior judicial decisions on present litigation. The principle
of stare decisis, or the doctrine of precedent, dictates that like
cases should be decided in like fashion by courts in a single
jurisdiction. The aim of stare decisis, like that of former adju-
dication, is to ensure "stability and consistency in judicial deci-
sions, allowing people to plan their conduct."' 3 The notion
underlying the principle is that "[t]he law must appear to be
rationally consistent if it is to be accepted as an impersonal ar-
biter of disputes.""
While similar to former adjudication, stare decisis is dis-
tinguishable on two grounds. First, while former adjudication
only precludes subsequent litigation between parties to a pre-
vious action and, in some cases those in privity with them, stare
decisis applies equally to all litigants regardless of any connec-
tion to the earlier action. Second, while former adjudication
precludes litigation of questions of both law and fact, stare de-
cisis applies only to questions of law without regard to case-
specific facts except as they may illustrate the point of law.' 5
Put succinctly, "former adjudication establishes a judgment as
final between specific litigants in a particular dispute, whereas
stare decisis perpetuates the general principle by which a par-
ticular case is decided and incorporates it into the body of
law."' 6
U.S. law has never adhered to the more rigid English
13. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.1, at 609
(1985).
14. Id.
15. See generally id. at 609-10.
16. Id. at 610.
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model of the doctrine of stare decisis. From its beginning the
U.S. Supreme Court asserted its prerogative to change its
mind, and has repeatedly done so on various issues through-
out its existence. 7 Similarly, the lower federal courts have
strayed from stare decisis principles when it was appropriate to
permit change.'" Still, the doctrine of stare decisis plays a sig-
nificant role in American jurisprudence today. While a court
may reconsider its previous decisions, it has no obligation to
reconsider settled issues. Where jurisdiction is largely discre-
tionary, the Supreme Court, under principles of stare decisis,
may deny the petition for a writ of certiorari. Where jurisdic-,
tion is obligatory in the court of appeals, the court may deny
oral argument and dispose of the case summarily."' Beyond
this, however, the binding role of precedent becomes less cer-
tain.
Stare decisis applies not only to successive decisions in the
same court, but also to decisions in lower courts owing obedi-
ence to that court. This obedience principle is crucial to the
American hierarchical court system. 20  All state and federal
courts owe obedience to the decisions of the Supreme Court
on questions of federal law. The district court in a circuit, in
turn, owes obedience to a decision of the court of appeals for
that circuit. 2' The court of appeals in one circuit owes no obe-
17. See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940) (noting that "stare decisis
is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest deci-
sion, however recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a
prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by ex-
perience"); Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 238 (1924) (stating
that stare decisis is not "universal, inexorable command .. .instances in which the
Court has disregarded its admonition are many"); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630 (1943); see also IBJ. MOORE, W. TAGGART &J. WICKER,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 0.402 [1], at 10 (2d ed. 1988).
18. See IBJ. MOORE, W. TAGGART &J. WICKER, supra note 17, § 0.402[1], at 11
n. 11 (citing United States v. Cocke, 399 F.2d 433, 448-49 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 922 (1969);Johns v. Redeker, 406 F.2d 878, 882 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 853 (1969)).
19. See 1BJ. MOORE, W. TAGGART &J. WICKER, supra note 17, § 0.402[1], at 11.
20. See id. at 12 n. 15.
21. M.A.S., Inc. v. Van Curler Broadcasting Corp., 357 F. Supp. 686, 691
(D.D.C. 1973). A federal district court sitting as a local court in the District of Co-
lumbia should defer to the interpretation of local statutes by the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit, at least where federal statutory or constitu-
tional issues are not involved; the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
would not blindly follow decision of the D.C. Circuit when confronted with factors
which were not considered in opinion of the D.C. Circuit and which, if they had been
1990-1991] STARE DECISIS
dience to decisions of a court of appeals in another circuit,
although it may find the rationale persuasive. 2
Similarly, district courts are not bound by the decisions of
the courts of appeals in other circuits.2 3 When there is a con-
flict among circuits, decisions of the circuit in which the district
court sits must be followed.24 In cases in which the issue has
not been decided in the circuit, however, decisions of the
courts of appeals in other circuits may be highly persuasive.25
The district courts also do not owe obedience to the deci-
sions of the U.S. Claims Court or the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit.26  Furthermore, district courts are not
considered, probably would have produced a contrary result. Id.; see General Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Watson, 184 F. Supp. 344, 350 (D.D.C. 1960) (noting that decisions of
D.C. Circuit are binding on U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia); see also
IBJ. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, supra note 17, § 0.402[1], at 14.
22. Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1306 n.2 (2d Cir.
1974) (stating that cases from other circuits do not bind Second Circuit); City Stores
Co. v. Lerner Shops of Dist. of Columbia, Inc., 410 F.2d 1010, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(noting that decisions of federal district courts and other courts of appeal are not
binding on D.C. Circuit and are looked to only for their persuasive effect); see IB J.
MOORE, W. TAGGART &J. WICKER, supra note 17, § 0.402[11, at 15.
23. Lerner Shops, 410 F.2d at 1014; see IBJ. MOORE, W. TAGGART &J. WICKER,
supra note 17, § 0.402[l], at 16 & n.22 (citing United States v. Diamond, 430 F.2d
688, 692 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Motte, 251 F. Supp. 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
United States v. Florea, 68 F. Supp. 367, 376 (D. Or. 1945); Swiderski v.
Moodenbaugh, 45 F. Supp. 790, 791 (D. Or. 1942); Pepsin Syrup Co. v. Schwaner, 35
F.2d 197, 199 (S.D. Il1. 1929)).
24. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 597 F. Supp. 1515, 1520
(D.C. Cir. 1984). The court stated that
stare decisis compels district courts to adhere to a decision of the Court of
Appeals of their circuit until such time as the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court of the United States sees fit to overrule the decision ....
District courts are not at liberty to resolve splits between Circuits no matter
how egregiously in error they feel their Circuit to be.
Id.; see Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 663 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
828 (1982); see IBJ. MOORE, W. TAGGART &J. WICKER, supra note 17, § 0.402[!1, at
n.22.
25. Oxy Metal Indus. Corp. v. Roper Corp., 579 F. Supp. 664, 678 (D. Md.
1984) (noting that federal district court follows precedent established by U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, available precedent of U.S. Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals and Court of Claims, and other case law considered persuasive);
Kollsman v. Ladd, 226 F. Supp. 186, 188 (D.D.C. 1964) (stating that decisions of
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are not binding on D.C. District Court but are
given great weight and treated with respect); King v. United States, 10 F. Supp. 206,
209 (D. Md.), afd, 79 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1935); see IBJ. MOORE, W. TAGGART &J.
WICKER, supra note 17, § 0.402[1], at n.22.
26. See IBJ. MOORE, W. TAGGART &J. WICKER, supra note 17, § 0.402[11], at 17
n.24 (citing United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164 (1976)).
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bound by decisions of the CIT, whose decisions are also within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. Federal Cir-
cuit decisions bind the CIT and are in turn bound by the
Supreme Court, but neither the Federal Circuit nor the CIT
owes obedience under the doctrine of stare decisis to the deci-
sions of the district courts or the other courts of appeals.27
However, the holdings of the Federal Circuit's predecessor
courts2 8 are treated by the Federal Circuit as binding prece-
dent.2 9
The district courts, like the courts of appeals, owe no obe-
dience to the decisions of their counterparts in other dis-
tricts. 0 This is true of districts within the same circuit.3I Fur-
thermore, the decisions of three-judge district courts are held
to have no greater authority in this respect than those of a sin-
gle judge. 2
Although most treatises consider a district court judge to
be bound by the decisions of his colleagues on the court, case
law shows that some judges do not believe this to be the case.
Instead, they view the precedential effect of the other judges'
decisions as persuasive, but not binding authority.3 3 The right
27. See IBJ. MOORE, W. TAGGART &J. WICKER, supra note 17, § 0.402[1], at 17-
18 (citing Watson v. Allen, 254 F.2d 342, 347-48 (D.C. Cir. 1958)).
28. The predecessor courts of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
were the U.S. Court of Claims and the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
29. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982); see Al-
goma Steel Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 240, 243 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating Cus-
toms Court decisions are considered decisions of same court), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
3244 (1989); Department of Energy v. Westland, 565 F.2d 685, 690 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
In an action by the Energy Research and Development Administration (the "ERDA")
to have a patent issued to it instead of the inventor or his assignee, the ERDA was
bound by rule of stare decisis insofar as it had been judicially decided. Id. "The
position of this court . . . is clear and consistent with that of the other appellate
courts. A readjudication of issues previously determined demands a clear and con-
vincing showing of error." Id.; see IBJ. MOORE, W. TAGGART &J. WICKER, supra note
17, § 0.40211], at 18.
30. E.E.O.C. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 576 F. Supp. 1530, 1535 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (stating that prior district court decision not binding on another district court);
see IBJ. MOORE, W. TAGGART &J. WICKER, supra note 17, § 0.402[1], at 16.
31. See IBJ. MOORE, W. TAGGART &J. WICKER, supra note 17, § 0.402[1], at 16
n.21 (citing In re Bender Body Co., 47 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Ohio 1942)).
32. See IBJ. MOORE, W. TAGGART &J. WICKER, supra note 17, § 0.402[11], at 16
n.21 (citing Farley v. Farley, 481 F.2d 1009, 1012 (3d Cir. 1973); Remick Music Corp.
v. Interstate Hotel Co. of Neb., 58 F. Supp. 523, 541-42 (D. Neb. 1944), afd, 157
F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 809 (1947)).
33. Powell & Concannon, supra note 1, at 358 (citing 21 C.J.S. Courts § 196
(1966)).
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to appeal to the court of appeals, however, makes it unlikely
that conflicts of this nature will long survive.
As a result, the precise role of precedent in district court
proceedings has never been clearly defined. Even if one con-
cludes that the doctrine of stare decisis is not controlling
among judges of a district court, however, the pull of stare de-
cisis nevertheless remains strong.34 Case law reveals varying
attitudes toward stare decisis at the district court level.
In United States v. Anaya,s5 for example, the court strongly
promoted the doctrine of stare decisis. In Anaya, the court
confronted eighty-four motions to dismiss criminal indict-
ments arising out of the same action. 6 Pursuant to sections
136 and 137 of title 28 of the United States Code, and accord-
ing to an order authorized by all active judges and the chief
judge, the cases were transferred to the court en banc to hear
argument and rule on the motions simultaneously. 37 Explain-
ing the reasons for its decision to hear the motions en banc, the
court emphasized its "disinclination to depart from the doc-
trine of intra-court comity," 3 8 stating that the "doctrine . . .
establishes a general rule that, absent unusual or exceptional
circumstances, judges of coordinate jurisdiction within a juris-
diction should follow brethren judges' rulings. ' 3 9
In Mueller v. Allen,4° the third division of the District Court
of Minnesota voiced a less strict view of stare decisis:
A court is not irretrievably bound by its own precedents,
but in the interests of uniformity, stability, and certainty in
the law, will follow the rule of law established in earlier
cases unless clearly convinced that the rule was originally
34. Id. at 359 (citing Hungerford v. Portland Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n,
235 Or. 412, 384 P.2d 1009 (1963)).
35. 509 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Fla. 1980), afd sub nom. United States v. Zayes-
Morales, 685 F.2d 1272 (11th Cir. 1982).
36. Id. at 292.
37. Id. at 293.
38. Id.
39. Id.; see Buna v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1360, 1365 (N.D. Cal.
1977) (stating that "Ij]udges of the same district court customarily follow a previous
decision of a brother judge upon the same question except in unusual or exceptional
circumstances"); White v. Baltic Conveyor Co., 209 F. Supp. 716, 722 (D.N.J. 1962)
(noting that "by comity and tradition, brother judges in the same district customarily
follow the other's decisions"); see also Powell & Concannon, supra note 1, at 360.
40. 514 F. Supp. 998, 1000 (D. Minn. 1981), affid, 676 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir. 1982),
aft'd, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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erroneous or is no longer sound because of changed condi-
tions, and that more good than harm would result from a
departure from precedent. However, a court's decision is
not binding upon courts of equal rank.4'
On the other end of the spectrum some courts have taken
a liberal attitude toward the precedential effect of district court
decisions. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has declined to require adherence to the princi-
ples of stare decisis. In Starbuck v. San Francisco,42 the court
held that "stare decisis does not compel one district court judge
to follow the decision of another. 43
Thus, while it is not absolutely clear whether stare decisis
is a compelling or a persuasive force at the district court level,
the significance of the doctrine is without question. "The deci-
sions indicate that district court judges will ordinarily abide by
precedent established within their own districts. '4 4
The CIT is an Article III court, possessing all of the pow-
ers in law and equity of a district court of the United States.4 5
Like a district court, the judicial power of the CIT is exercised
by a single judge.46 Unlike a district court, however, the juris-
diction of the CIT is limited to a particular substantive area of
the law; its cases involve claims against the government. 47 CIT
appeals are heard exclusively by one appellate court, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Thus, the CIT is
bound by decisions of its two superior courts, the Federal Cir-
cuit and the Supreme Court.
Structurally, it appears that the CIT operates in much the
same way as the federal district courts. The doctrine of stare
decisis should apply with at least the persuasive force that it
41. Id. (citation omitted); see King v. County of Nassau, 581 F. Supp. 493, 503
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (refusing to follow precedent set by another judge of same district
because other judge had explicitly rejected Supreme Court precedent).
42. 556 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1977).
43. Id. at 457 n.13; see 21 C.J.S. Courts § 196 (1966) (finding numerous instances
where divisions or departments render conflicting decisions due to feeling they are in
same situation as coordinate courts, one of which is not bound by decision of an-
other).
44. Powell & Concannon, supra note 1, at 361.
45. U.S. CoNs-r. art. III; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 251 & 1585 (1988); Manufacture De
Machines Du Haut-Rhin v. Von Raab, 569 F. Supp. 877, 883 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 254 (1988).
47. Powell & Concannon, supra note 1, at 363.
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does in the district courts. In fact, however, the CIT has taken
a somewhat inconsistent approach to the doctrine.48
The binding aspect of judicial precedent varies depending
on the nature of the question decided. Courts are generally
more reluctant to deviate from a rule established by precedent
"where rights of the public are concerned, where a precedent
has guided numerous people in their conduct.... or where the
precedents have become rules governing commercial transac-
tions., 4 9 Likewise, the nature of the issue influences the CIT's
..adherence to principles of stare decisis. 50 In the adjudication
of disputes arising out of the customs laws, the force of stare
decisis has consistently been strong.5 By contrast, in the adju-
dication of disputes arising out of the antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty laws, the force of stare decisis has been any-
thing but strong.
II. THE YUASA PROBLEM
A. The Development of the Preliminary Standard
Turning to the first case study, we examine the case in
which the independence of CIT judges has created ambiguity
in the application of a particularly important legal question:
the standard governing the Commission's determinations in
preliminary antidumping investigations. 2 Section 733(a) of
the Tariff Act' of 1930, as amended, requires that the Commis-
sion determine whether, based on the best information avail-
48. Id. at 364.
49. Id. at 362 (citing 20 AM. JUR. 2d Courts § 194 (1965)).
50. See De Laval Separator Co. v. United States, 511 F. Supp. 810, 814 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1981) (stating applicability of stare decisis lies within discretion of CIT) (citing
Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205 (1910); Marianao Sugar Trading Corp. v. United
States, 29 Cust. Ct. 275 (1952), affd, 41 C.C.P.A. 236 (1954)).
51. See Inter-Pacific Corp. v. United States, 594 F. Supp. 739, 741 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1984) ("[sftare decisis is applicable [in customs action] where a decision in a
prior case involves the same merchandise and the same issues as those in the present
case (citation omitted). Where the merchandise or issues are not the same the doc-
trine of stare decisis is not controlling (citation omitted)."); General Elec. Co. v.
United States, 476 F. Supp. 1082, 1085 (Cust. Ct. 1979) ("unless shown to be errone-
ous, a prior decision [of the Customs Court] should be regarded as stare decisis in a
subsequent case involving same merchandise and legal issues"), affd, 620 F.2d 883
(C.C.P.A. 1980); Allen Forwarding Co. v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 412,416 (Cust.
Ct. 1972) (stare decisis is applicable since no showing of error in prior decision).
52. The applicable statutory standard is the same in preliminary countervailing
duty investigations. 19 U.S.C. § 1671b (1988).
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able, there is a reasonable indication of material injury to a do-
mestic industry, or threat thereof, or material retardation of
the establishment of an industry, by reason of the subject im-
ports.58 The definition of material injury is the same in both
preliminary and final investigations, but in preliminary investi-
gations an affirmative determination is based on a reasonable
indication of material injury, as opposed to the finding of ac-
tual material injury or threat thereof required in a final deter-
mination. The statute is otherwise silent as to the precise na-
ture of a reasonable indication, or, conversely, what situations
might lead to a finding that a reasonable indication does not
exist.
The history of the reasonable indication standard at the
agency level and before the CIT is somewhat checkered. By
1984, a controversy had arisen over the proper application of
the standard in the course of several decisions of the CIT
which held that the Commission could not weigh conflicting
evidence in arriving at a preliminary determination. In the first
of these decisions, Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 54 the CIT
remanded to the Commission two countervailing duty determi-
nations on the ground that the Commission had impermissibly
weighed conflicting evidence in rendering the negative prelim-
inary determinations.55 The CIT held that the purpose of the
preliminary determinations
should have been simply to find whether there were any
facts which raised the possibility of injury. The resolution
or interpretation of conflicting facts should have been Pe-
served for a possible final injury determination. 56
Subsequently, injeannette Sheet Glass Corp. v. United States,57 the
CIT again rejected the proposition that the Commission could
weigh evidence in its preliminary determinations. The CIT
noted that the standard to be applied in Commission prelimi-
nary investigations "was intended by Congress to be adminis-
tered as a very low evidentiary threshold. ' '58
53. Id. § 1673a.
54. 591 F. Supp. 640 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
55. Id. at 650.
56. Id. (emphasis omitted).
57. 607 F. Supp. 123 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), appeal dismissed, 803 F.2d 1576 (Fed.
Cir. 1986), vacated in part, 654 F. Supp. 179 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
58. Id. at 129.
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Shortly after the Jeannette Sheet Glass decision, the Commis-
sion's position that it was entitled to weigh evidence in prelimi-
nary investigations resurfaced in American Lamb Co. v. United
States. 9 In this appeal from a preliminary negative determina-
tion in Lamb Meat from New Zealand,60 the Commission invited
Judge DiCarlo of the CIT not to follow the earlier decisions of
his fellow judges and approve the Commission's weighing of
evidence." The CIT declined to adopt this argument in light
of the fact that the Commission's arguments had been rejected
three times within the previous year by two judges of the
CIT. 2 Judge DiCarlo stated that "[u]nder these circum-
stances, stare decisis counsels the Court to follow the prior deci-
sions" and indicated that the Commission should address its
arguments to the Federal Circuit.63
On appeal, the Federal Circuit upheld the Commission's
practice of Weighing evidence in deciding whether information
in a preliminary investigation raises a "reasonable indication"
of material injury or threat thereof and thus under the statute
warrants proceeding to a final investigation.64 The Federal
Circuit stated that the purpose of preliminary investigations is
to avoid the cost and disruption to trade caused by unneces-
sary investigations. 65 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held
that the reasonable indication standard requires more than a
finding that there is a "possibility" of material injury, and the
Commission is to weigh the evidence it has obtained to deter-
mine if that evidence demonstrates that a reasonable indica-
tion *xists. 66
The terms, however, in which the decision was framed in-
troduced a confusion into the law as to what standard the
Commission should apply. The Federal Circuit found that
[s]ince the enactment of the 1974 Act, ITC has consistently
viewed the statutory "reasonable indication" standard as
one requiring that it issue a negative determination, as
59. 611 F. Supp. 979 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), aff'd, 785 F.2d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
60. USITC Pub. 1534, Inv. No. 731-TA-188 (Preliminary) (1984).
61. American Lamb Co., 611 F. Supp. at 981.
62. Id.
63. Id. This was the first instance in which the Commission was afforded the
opportunity for an interlocutory appeal of this issue to the Federal Circuit. Id.
64. American Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
65. Id. at 1004.
66. Id.
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above indicated, only when (1) the record as a whole con-
tains clear and convincing evidence that there is no material
injury or threat of such injury; and (2) no likelihood exists
that contrary evidence will arise in a final investigation.
That view, involving a process of weighing the evidence but
under guidelines requiring clear and convincing evidence of
"no reasonable indication", and no likelihood of later contrary
evidence, provides fully adequate protection against unwar-
ranted terminations.67
Based on this language, there is an apparent ambiguity
whether the relevant part of the standard is clear and convinc-
ing evidence of no material injury, or clear and convincing evi-
dence of no reasonable indication of material injury, the latter ar-
guably being a far tighter standard for a negative determina-
tion than the former.
Following the American Lamb decision, the Commission
moved the CIT to reconsider its previous orders in theJeannette
Sheet Glass case. 68 The CIT acknowledged that the Federal Cir-
cuit had expressly overruled Republic Steel and its "progeny,"
and had approved the Commission's practice of weighing evi-
dence in preliminary determinations. 69 Further, the CIT, ap-
plying the preliminary indication standard articulated by the
Federal Circuit in American Lamb, held that there was "a ra-
tional basis" for the Commission's original negative prelimi-
nary determination. 70 Without expressly reiterating the lan-
guage of the Federal Circuit, the CIT recognized that the
Commission had properly applied the reasonable indication
standard and correctly weighed the conflicting evidence.
7 1
The CIT next addressed the preliminary standard in Wells
Manufacturing Company v. United States,72 which was an appeal
from the Commission's negative preliminary determination in
67. Id. at 1001 (emphasis added). The clear and convincing evidence standard
requires that the evidence supporting a negative determination be more than "sub-
stantial," or a preponderance of the evidence on the record. Because the Commis-
sion is permitted to weigh evidence, it may issue a negative preliminary determina-
tion even if some evidence supports an affirmative determination. See Buildex, Inc. v.
Kason Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1461, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
68. Jeannette Sheet Glass Corp. v. United States, 654 F. Supp. 179 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1987).
69. Id. at 182.
70. Id. at 182-83.
71. Id. at 183-84.
72. 677 F. Supp. 1239 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
STARE DECISIS
Iron Bars from Brazil.73 The CIT, applying American Lamb, held
that there was a rational basis in the record for the Commis-
sion's negative preliminary determination. 4 Again without
addressing the precise language of the standard set forth in
American Lamb, the CIT recognized the Federal Circuit's ap-
proval of the weighing of evidence by the Commission and the
rejection of the "mere possibility" test previously articulated
by the CIT.75
The following year in Maverick Tube Corp. v. United States,7 6
the CIT applied the American Lamb standard in remanding for
further consideration several aspects of the separate views, re-
spectively, of Commissioners Liebeler, Brunsdale, Lodwick,
and Rohr.77 In the review of Commissioner Liebeler's and
Commissioner Brunsdale's views, the CIT found that elements
of each commissioner's causation analysis were not based on
substantial evidence and were not in accordance with the law.78
In its review of the views of Commissioners Lodwick and Rohr,
the CIT remanded a portion of their determination concerning
treatment of a specific lost sale evidence "to consider whether
the likelihood that contrary evidence will arise in a full investi-
gation changes the Commissioners' assessment of material in-
jury or threat of material injury. ' 79
Addressing the American Lamb standard, Judge DiCarlo
noted that the Commission's role in a preliminary determina-
tion is to decide, based on the best information available,
whether there is a reasonable indication that a domestic indus-
try is materially injured or threatened with material injury by
reason of the merchandise under investigation.80 Judge Di-
Carlo further recognized that
[O]ur appellate court affirmed the administrative interpre-
tation of this statute as meaning that the Commission
should reach a negative injury finding in a preliminary in-
vestigation only when the record as a whole contains clear
73. USITC Pub. 1472, Inv. No. 701-TA-208 (Preliminary) (1983).
74. Wells Mfg., 677 F. Supp. at 1246.
75. Id.
76. 687 F. Supp. 1569 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
77. Id. at 1577.
78. Id. at 1575.
79. Id. at 1577.
80. Id. at 1573.
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and convincing evidence that there is no material injury or
threat of material injury by reason of imports, and there is
no likelihood that contrary evidence will arise in a final in-
vestigation.8
Thus, the Commission's interpretation of the preliminary stan-
dard as approved in American Lamb was expressly incorporated
in the decisions of several judges of the CIT.
Following close upon Judge DiCarlo's opinion in Wells
Manufacturing, Judge Carman discussed the preliminary stan-
dard in the context of a review of a Commission determination
dismissing a request for review and revocation or modification
of an antidumping order pursuant to section 751 of the Tariff
Act of 1930.82 In Avesta AB v. United States," the plaintiffs had
urged that the Commission should base its decision whether to
commence a review proceeding upon a reasonable indication
of changed circumstances.8 4 Plaintiffs argued that "reasonable
indication" in this context corresponded to the "mere possibil-
ity" test articulated in Republic Steel and that the Commission
was precluded from weighing evidence in determining whether
to institute a section 751 review investigation. 85 Rejecting
these arguments, the CIT held that in deciding whether to
commence a review proceeding under section 751(b), the
Commission need not apply the reasonable indication stan-
dard applicable to preliminary injury determinations, inter-
preting American Lamb as having "affirmed the [Commission's]
longstanding interpretation of 'reasonable indication.' "86
Further, Judge Carman specifically noted that the Federal Cir-
cuit had categorically rejected the mere possibility standard of
Republic Steel and its prohibition against considering and weigh-
ing all of the evidence of record.87
Roughly one month after the Avesta decision, Judge
Aquilino handed down his second remand decision in the ap-
peal of the Commission's negative preliminary determination
81. Id. (citing American Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994, 1001 (Fed.
Cir. 1986)).
82. 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (1988).
83. 689 F. Supp. 1173 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
84. Id. at 1179.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1180.
87. Id.
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in 12-Volt Motorcycle Batteries from Taiwan.88 In this decision,
captioned Yuasa-General Battery Corp. v. United States ("Yuasa
II"),89 following an initial remand9" the CIT reversed and re-
manded the Commission's second preliminary negative deter-
mination, holding that the opinions in support of the major-
ity's determination "are unpersuasive that the requirement of
clear and convincing evidence of no reasonable indication of a threat of
material injury and no likelihood of later contrary evidence is
sustainable on the existent record."91 Further, the CIT stated
that the commissioners' opinions "do not appear to take the
approach American Lamb contemplates," specifying that "the
plurality seems to have considered the evidence for an indica-
tion of the affirmative, rather than of the negative."92 In light
of this language, it appears that at least one judge of the CIT
has adopted an interpretation of the preliminary standard at
odds with that of other judges of the CIT and, arguably, with
the American Lamb decision.
B. Application of the Preliminary Standard and the Effect of
Yuasa II
Following the American Lamb decision, the Commission im-
mediately began to frame its discussion of the preliminary
standard in the language of the first "test" set forth in the deci-
sion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. For
example, roughly one month after the American Lamb opinion
the Commission made the following statement of the prelimi-
nary standard in Top-of-the-Stove Stainless Steel Cooking Ware from
Korea and Taiwan:
In a preliminary investigation the Commission's "reason-
able indication" determination is based upon weighing all
of the available information, which includes the factual alle-
gations made by petitioners, contrary arguments presented
by respondents, and data obtained through Commission
questionnaires and other information-gathering techniques.
The Commission will find that there is no reasonable indi-
88. USITC Pub. 2126, Inv. No. 731-TA-238 (Preliminary) (Sept. 1986).
89. 688 F. Supp. 1551 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
90. Yuasa-General Battery Corp. v. United States, 661 F. Supp. 1214 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1987).
91. Yuaa, 688 F. Supp. at 1554 (emphasis in original).
92. Id.
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cation of material injury where: (1) the record as a whole
contains clear and convincing evidence that there is no ma-
terial injury or threat of such injury; and (2) nothing in the
record indicates a likelihood that contrary evidence will
arise in the event of a final investigation. 93
The Commission periodically discussed the standard in
these terms in its preliminary determinations over the ensuing
two years. 4 Indeed, all members of the Commission agreed
that the two-prong test of clear and convincing evidence of no
material injury and no likelihood of contrary evidence in a final
investigation was the judicially approved predicate for a nega-
tive preliminary determination. 5 However, this agreement
ended shortly after the decision of Judge Aquilino in Yuasa
11.96
In Shock Absorbers and Parts, Components, and Subassemblies
Thereoffrom Brazil, 97 Acting Chairman Brunsdale and Commis-
sioners Liebeler, Lodwick and Cass reaffirmed that the statu-
tory reasonable indication standard requires a negative prelim-
inary determination if: "(1) the record as a whole contains
clear and convincing evidence that there is no material injury
or threat of such injury; and (2) no likelihood exists that con-
93. Top-of-the-Stove Stainless Steel Cooking Ware from Korea and Taiwan,
USITC Pub. 1820, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-267-268 & 731-TA-304-305 (Preliminary) (Mar.
1986) at 3-4 (Views of Commissioners Stern, Liebeler, Eckes, Lodwick, Rohr, and
Brunsdale).
94. See, e.g., Color Picture Tubes from Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea,
and Singapore, USITC Pub. 1937, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-367 - 370 (Preliminary) (Jan.
1987) at 6-7 (stating that Commission should continue preliminary investigation un-
less there is clear and convincing evidence of no material injury, and no likelihood
that contrary evidence will arise in final investigation); Certain Copier Toner from
Japan, USITC Pub. 1960, Inv. No. 731-TA-373 (Preliminary) (Mar. 1987) at 12 n.36
(involving clear and convincing evidence of no material retardation and no likelihood
of contrary evidence arising in final investigation).
95. See Certain All-Terrain Vehicles from Japan, USITC Pub. 2071, Inv. No.
731-TA-388 (Preliminary) (Mar. 1988) at 17-18 (Views of Commissioners Eckes,
Rohr, Lodwick, and Cass); id. at 21 (Additional Views of Commissioners Liebeler and
Brunsdale).
96. Yuasa-General Battery Corp. v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 1551 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1988). At approximately the same time as the decision in Yuasa II, the Com-
mission issued a determination following its previously articulated understanding of
the American Lamb standard. Sewn Cloth Headwear from the People's Republic of
China, USITC Pub. 2096, Inv. No. 731-TA-405 (Preliminary) (July 1988) at 10-11 &
41 (Views of Commissioner Cass).
97. USITC Pub. 2128, Inv. No. 731-TA-421 (Preliminary) (Sept. 1988).
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trary evidence will arise in a final investigation."98 These
Commissioners stated that the standard as applied by the
Commission had been affirmed by the Federal Circuit in Ameri-
can Lamb and that the CIT has on several occasions followed
that case to affirm preliminary negative determinations by the
Commission.99 Further, the Commission majority noted that
the CIT had reversed a preliminary negative determination in
Yuasa H, stating that
[t]he Yuasa court appears to have viewed the Commission as
analyzing only how strong was the case favoring an affirma-
tive determination. The Commission does not read the
Yuasa decision as mandating a change in the Commission's
standard, which has been sustained by the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit.' 00
In his concurring views to Shock Absorbers, Commissioner
Eckes stated that his "reading of Yuasa raises important and
unanswered questions about how the Commission is to imple-
ment American Lamb."'' Commissioner Eckes asked
Does a determination that there is "clear and convincing ev-
idence of no material injury" rely on a standard which is
compatible with the statutory requirement that the Com-
mission shall make a determination of whether there is a
reasonable indication that an industry is materially injured, or
is threatened with material injury?
For this Commissioner, and I believe my colleagues,
this slight variation in language raises additional fundamen-
tal questions about the proper standard for making prelimi-
nary title VII decisions. Indeed, is there one standard, or
98. Id. at 4 (Views of Acting Chairman Brunsdale, Commissioners Liebeler,
Lodwick, and Cass).
99. Id. at 5-6 & n.12.
100. Id. at 6 n. 13; see Electrolytic Manganese Dioxide from Greece, Ireland, and
Japan, USITC Pub. 2097, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-406 - 408 (Preliminary) at 21-25 (July
1988). In his additional views in Shock Absorbers, Commissioner Cass stated positively
the American Lamb standard as meaning that "the Commission should reach negative
[preliminary] determinations when the evidence of record 'on balance does not lend
enough support to the Petitioner's claim to provide at least a colorable basis for an
affirmative determination and when the relevant information that remains to be gath-
ered does not leave open the prospect that any judgement made on the current rec-
ord well might be changed at the final determination stage.' " Shock Absorbers, USITC
Pub. 2128, at 51 (Views of Commissioner Cass) (citing Electrolytic Manganese, USITC
Pub. 2097, at 24 (Additional Views of Commissioner Cass)).
101. Shock Absorbers, USITC Pub. 2128, at 35 (Views of Commissioner Eckes).
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are there now two? Did the CIT improperly modify the
CAFC [Federal Circuit] standard? Or, was the CIT telling
the Commission that it has incorrectly implemented the
American Lamb standard?10 2
Commissioner Eckes then concluded that, "[b]ased on the best
available information, I find there is clear and convincing evi-
dence of no reasonable indication of material injury or a threat of mate-
rial injury and no likelihood of contrary evidence in a final investiga-
tion.""o
Following the Shock Absorbers determination, various com-
missioners undertook an extensive discussion of the appropri-
ate preliminary standard in New Steel Rails from Canada.'0 4 In
separate views, Acting Chairman Brunsdale, Commissioner
Eckes, and Commissioner Cass each commented on the rea-
sonable indication standard, particularly in light of the Yuasa H
decision.
In her views, Acting Chairman Brunsdale summarized in
the following manner past Commission practice implementing
the American Lamb standard: "The Commission thus has ren-
dered negative determinations either because the evidence sup-
porting the allegations in the petition does not amount to a
'reasonable indication of injury' or because the contrary evi-
dence is so clear and convincing that any evidence supporting
the petition did not amount to a 'reasonable indication.' "10'
Commissioner Brunsdale added that
[t]he addition [by the CIT in Yuasa] of the "no reasonable
indication" language to the original American Lamb standard
is troublesome because it draws the key statutory phrase
into the standard purporting to implement the statute, ren-
dering the entire exercise circular. Moreover, while the
change in the American Lamb language was most likely a tran-
scription error, it does raise the unlikely possibility that the
102. Id. at 37-38 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
103. Id. at 39 (emphasis in original). Commissioner Eckes also noted that his
determination would have been the same had he employed the "'clear and convinc-
ing evidence that there is no material injury or threat of such injury' standard." Id. at
39 n.7.
104. USITC Pub. 2135, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-297 & 731-TA-422 (Preliminary)
(Nov. 1988).
105. Id. at 67-68 (emphasis in original). Commissioner Brunsdale also refer-
enced the Shock Absorbers determination. Id. at 68 n.41 (citing Shock Absorbers, USITC
Pub. 2128, at 5).
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court intended to modify the original American Lamb lan-
guage by lowering the threshold at which the Commission
must render affirmative determinations.' 0 6
Commissioner Eckes reiterated his view that "considera-
ble ambiguity remains" with respect to the preliminary stan-
dard and that the CIT's decisions in Maverick, Wells Manufactur-
ing, and Jeannette Sheet Glass with respect to preliminary negative
Commission determinations "do not provide unequivocal gui-
dance nor do they help resolve the ambiguities raised by the
most recent application of the standard in the Yuasa deci-
sion.'"107 The Commissioner also stated that his interpretation
of the preliminary standard as articulated, for example, in the
Shock Absorbers determination is not "tantamount to resur-
recting the CIT's 'mere possibility' standard from Republic
Steel.' ' 0 8 Commissioner Eckes pointed out that the "no likeli-
hood [of] contrary evidence" portion of the American Lamb test
obviates the application of the "mere possibility" standard em-
ployed in Republic Steel.' 09 Finally, the Commissioner noted
that "[u]ncertainty regarding the standard for Commission de-
cision-making can only frustrate predictability and consistency
in the administration of our trade laws." '"10
In his additional views, Commissioner Cass noted that
there may be confusion over the appropriate standard as a re-
sult of the Yuasa H decision. Commissioner Cass maintained
that "[t]here is no basis, either in American Lamb or elsewhere,
for the argument that the Commission must issue affirmative
determinations in preliminary investigations unless respon-
dent offers clear and convincing evidence of the absence of
material injury.""' Commissioner Cass interpreted the pre-
liminary standard to mean that
the Commission may issue a negative determination either
because the evidence presented in support of a petition
106. Id. at 58-59.
107. New Steel Rails, USITC Pub. 2135, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-297 (Preliminary)
(Nov. 1988) at 17 (Additional Views of Commissioner Eckes).
108. Id.; see Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 640 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1984). But see American Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (disapproving of Republic Steel).
109. New Steel Rails, USITC Pub. 2135, at 18.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 29 (Additional Views of Commissioner Cass) (emphasis in original).
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does not, standing alone, amount to a reasonable indication
of injury or threat of injury, or because the contrary evi-
dence is so clear and convincing that the evidence support-
ing the petition cannot on the record as a whole be said to
provide reasonable indication of injury." 2
Following these two preliminary determinations, it be-
came apparent that, where there had been one Commission
approach to the preliminary standard before the Yuasa-General
Battery Corp. v. United States ("Yuasa I")"11 decision, three ap-
proaches emerged following that decision. The majority of
commissioners continued to use the two-prong "clear and con-
vincing evidence of no material injury/no likelihood of con-
trary evidence" language of American Lamb." 4 Commissioner
Eckes adopted the "clear and convincing evidence of no rea-
sonable indication" statement from American Lamb that was re-
lied upon in Yuasa H. Finally, Commissioners Brunsdale
and Cass recast the standard they believed had been adopted
by the Commission as allowing the issuance of a preliminary
negative determination if one of two standards were met: the
evidence presented in support of the petition, standing alone,
did not amount to a reasonable indication, or the evidence con-
trary to that supporting the petition was clear and convincing
that there was no reasonable indication of material injury.'' 6
While these three articulations of the preliminary standard
post-Yuasa II have remained fairly constant, the question con-
tinues to elicit comment by the Commission and its members.
For example, five of six commissioners recently noted that the
American Lamb decision stated that (1) the purpose of prelimi-
nary determinations is to avoid the cost and disruption to trade
caused by unnecessary investigations, (2) the reasonable indi-
cation standard requires more than a finding that there is a
possibility of such injury, and (3) the Commission may weigh
the evidence before it to determine whether there is clear and
112. Id. at 30 (emphasis in original). In his Views, Commissioner Cass refer-
enced the "Additional Views of Vice Chairman Brunsdale and Commissioners
Liebeler and Cass" in Electrolytic Manganese Dioxide from Japan, Ireland and
Greece, USITC Pub. 2097, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-406 - 408 (Preliminary) (July 1988) at
23-24. New Steel Rails, USITC Pub. 2135, at 25-26 n.14.
113. 661 F. Supp. 1214 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
114. See supra notes 96-102.
115. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
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convincing evidence of no material injury or threat thereof and
no likelihood of contrary evidence in a final investigation." '7
Commissioner Cass, while generally agreeing with this discus-
sion, offered additional views in which he stated that "the
Commission need not in all investigations have clear and con-
vincing evidence of the absence of material injury before
reaching a negative preliminary determination." '" 8 Without
further explanation of what circumstances might warrant such
a determination, the Commissioner further noted that there
was "sufficient evidence already on the record to make it clear
that a negative determination would in all likelihood be
reached if this investigation were to proceed to the final
stages."''g Ensuing preliminary determinations have periodi-
cally set forth further refinements of these views of the prelimi-
nary standard. 20
The foregoing case study shows that a single decision by a
judge of the CIT that is inconsistent with the decisions of other
judges on the same legal question can result in significant un-
certainty in agency administrative proceedings. Here, the stan-
dard for preliminary determinations had seemed a settled mat-
ter and Commission opinions reflected a common line of
thinking at least with respect to that issue. With the Yuasa II
decision, however, a new uncertainty over the issue was intro-
duced. Despite the extensive prior litigation on the point, the
appropriate standard for preliminary determinations will re-
main an open question for at least some commissioners and,
concomitantly, the parties to Commission proceedings, until
the matter is again resolved in the Federal Circuit.
III. THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS CASES: A SCENARIO IN
COHESIVE DECISION MAKING
While the first case study presented the problems that
117. Dry Aluminum Sulfate from Sweden, USITC Pub. 2174, Inv. No. 731-TA-
430 (Preliminary) (Mar. 1989) at 3 n.2. Commissioner Eckes relied on the "clear and
convincing evidence of no reasonable indication" standard he articulated in Steel
Rails. Id.
118. Id. at 28.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Certain Steel Rails from Mexico, USITC Pub. 2205, Inv. No. 731-
TA-435 (Preliminary) (July 1989) at 3-4, 17-20 (Views of Vice Chairman Cass); 12-
Volt Motorcycle Batteries from the Republic of Korea, USITC Pub. 2203, Inv. No.
731-TA-434 (Preliminary) (July 1989) at 3-4, 25-30 (Views of Vice Chairman Cass).
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arise from the complete independence of the judges of the
CIT, the second case study is illustrative of the benefits con-
ferred by careful attention by the various judges to their col-
leagues' decisions. The cases discussed in this scenario relate
to the use of economic analysis or, more specifically, elasticity
analysis by the Commission. In reviewing this issue, the judges
of the CIT have rendered four decisions that have set the pa-
rameters under which the Commission may employ elasticity
analysis. The cases reflect a clear understanding and applica-
tion of the prior decisions of individual judges by each subse-
quent judge to address the question. This has inured to the
benefit of those commissioners who employ elasticities in their
determinations, providing consistent, coherent guidelines for
the administrators of the statute and the parties appearing
before them.
At the outset of this discussion, it is necessary briefly to set
forth the meaning of elasticity analysis. The statute directs the
Commission in making its determinations to consider the vol-
ume of the imports subject to investigation, the effect of such
imports on domestic prices, and the impact of such imports on
the domestic industry in the context of production operations
in the United States.' 2' In evaluating these factors, the Com-
mission must consider (1) whether the volume of imports, or
any increase in that volume, is significant; (2) whether there
has been significant price underselling by the imported prod-
ucts; and (3) whether imports have otherwise depressed prices
to a significant degree, or have prevented price increases.1 22
In addition, the Commission must assess all relevant economic
121. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B) (1988), as amended Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1328(1), 102 Stat. 1107 (1988).
122. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(i-ii) (1988). Specifically, the statute provides that
in assessing the volume of imports and their price effects the Commission must con-
sider the following:
(i) Volume-In evaluating the volume of imports of merchandise, the Com-
mission shall consider whether the volume of imports of the merchandise,
or any increase in that volume, either in absolute terms or relative to pro-
duction or consumption in the United States, is significant.
(ii) Price-In evaluating the effect of imports of such merchandise on
prices, the Commission shall consider whether-
(I) there has been significant price underselling by the imported mer-
chandise as compared with the price of like products in the United
States, and
(II) the effect of imports of such merchandise otherwise depresses
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factors bearing on the state of the domestic industry, such as
actual and potential changes in profits, productivity, capacity
utilization, and investment. 23  Finally, the statute provides
that no one factor is dispositive, 124 and the Commission may
consider other economic factors relevant to its analysis of the
domestic industry in question, so long as it identifies such fac-
tors and fully explains their significance. 25
While the statute identifies specific factors to be "evalu-
ated" by the Commission, it is silent as to how these factors are
to be considered. Commission majority practice has involved
analyzing the factors of output, sales, profits, productivity, re-
turn on investment, capacity utilization, cash flow, inventories,
employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital, and invest-
prices to a significant degree or prevents price increases, which other-
wise would have occurred, to a significant degree.
Id. The 1988 Trade Act changed "price undercutting" to "price underselling" to
clarify that this provision does not require evidence of predatory pricing. See Pub. L.
No. 100-418, § 1328(2)(B), 102 Stat. 1107 (1988).
123. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iii) (1988). The so-called impact factors include,
but are not limited to:
(I) actual and potential decline in output, sales, market share, profits, pro-
ductivity, return on investments, and utilization of capacity,
(II) factors affecting domestic prices,
(III) actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employ-
ment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital, and investment, and
(IV) actual and potential negative effects on the existing development and
production efforts of the domestic industry, including efforts to develop a
derivative or more advanced version of the like product.
Id.
124. Id. § 1677(7)(E)(ii) (stating that "presence or absence of any factor.., shall
not necessarily give decisive guidance with respect to the determination by the Com-
mission of material injury"), cited in Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 519 F. Supp.
916, 922 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981).
The 1988 Trade Act further provides that the Commission "shall evaluate all
relevant economic factors described in [IV above] within the context of the business
cycle and conditions of competition that are distinctive to the affected industry." See
Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1328(2), 102 Stat. 1107 (1988).
125. Section 1328(1) of the 1988 Trade Act states that the Commission may
consider "such other economic factors as are relevant to the determination regarding
whether there is material injury by reason of imports," and goes on to require that
the Commission "explain its analysis of each factor considered ... and identify each
[nonspecified] factor and explain in full its relevance to the determination." Pub. L.
No. 100-418, § 1328(1), 102 Stat. 1107 (1988). The conference report states: "[tihe
ITC may consider, on a case-by-case basis, such other economic factors as are rele-
vant to an injury determination. If any other factor is considered, however, it must
be identified and its relevance explained." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. 616 (1988).
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ment to determine the existence of material injury.126 After
concluding that an industry is materially injured, the Commis-
sion then examines the condition of the industry in light of the
absolute volume of imports, the relative volume of imports
(e.g., market share), import prices, and domestic prices, to de-
termine whether a causal nexus between the imports and mate-
rial injury exists.' 27 In its causation analysis, the Commission
is expected to, and does, focus on the conditions of trade,
competition, and development concerning the industry in-
volved.
In the typical investigation, the Commission majority has
accomplished the foregoing analysis by examining data gath-
ered by questionnaires or submitted by parties to ascertain
trends relating to the enumerated statutory and other relevant
factors over a given period of time, usually three years. 28 This
approach has been challenged by several commissioners who
urge that trend analysis is a difficult means for determining the
effect of dumped imports on a domestic industry, separating
the effects of imports from those of other market factors, or for
divining whether the effects of dumped imports are material.
For these commissioners, the use of the "time tested tools of
elementary economics, including explicit consideration of rele-
vant elasticities," is the only way to analyze such issues as cau-
sation in a way that is transparent and predictable. 29 By em-
ploying the concept of elasticity, 30 commissioners who rely on
economic tools assert that they can better evaluate whether the
facts relating to the volume and price effects of imports have a
causal relationship to the various industry performance fac-
tors. '31
126. See, e.g., Mechanical Transfer Presses from Japan, USITC Pub. 2257, Inv.
No. 731-TA-429 (Final) (Feb. 1990) at 15.
127. A difference exists among commissioners regarding the propriety of ana-
lyzing material injury and causation on a bifurcated basis (i.e., material injury in an
objective sense divorced from the unfairly traded imports). See, e.g., New Steel Rails
from Canada, USITC Pub. 2217, Inv. No. 701-TA-297 (Final) (Sept. 1989) at 125-59.
128. British Steel Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 405, 411 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1984).
129. Certain Internal Combustion Industrial Forklift Trucks from Japan, USITC
Pub. 2082, Inv. No. 731-TA-377 (Final) (May 1988) at 34 (Views of Chairman
Liebeler); id. at 72-73 (Views of Vice Chairman Brunsdale).
130. Elasticity is defined in this context as the responsiveness of one variable,
such as price, to changes in another, such as volume.
131. Forklift Trucks, USITC Pub. 2082, at 74.
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The CIT first examined the Commission's use of elasticity
analysis in Alberta Pork Producers' Marketing Board v. United
States, "'32 which was a review of the Commission's final affirma-
tive determination on live swine imports in Live Swine and Pork
from Canada.' In its final Live Swine determination, the Com-
mission found that live swine prices are very sensitive to
changes in supply and used elasticity estimates submitted by
the parties to gauge the effect on domestic swine prices of
changes in the market share of Canadian volumes. 34 The
Commission majority found that the elasticity estimates indi-
cated that an increase in market penetration would result in a
significant decrease in price in the domestic market. 35
Plaintiff argued before the CIT that the majority's use of
the elasticity estimates was inappropriate. The plaintiff set
forth three reasons for this. First, the estimates do not take
into account nonsupply factors such as feed price and availabil-
ity. Second, the Commission did not test the confidence level
of the estimates to a scientifically acceptable level of certainty,
and third, the elasticity estimates were derived from models
using changes in the supply of both live swine and pork rather
than live swine only.13 6
The CIT, per Judge DiCarlo, rejected plaintiff's argument
that the Commission majority ignored nonsupply factors,
holding that evidence concerning such factors did not prevent
the Commission from finding that imports significantly de-
pressed or suppressed domestic prices. 7 The CIT also de-
clined to require the Commission to "reassess data collected
and accepted in its determination in order to verify its consis-
tency with some ambiguous level of scientific reliability."' ' 38
The CIT, however, remanded the case to the Commission
because the record was ambiguous as to whether the elasticity
132. 669 F. Supp. 445 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), af'd on remand, 683 F. Supp. 1398
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
133. Live Swine, USITC Pub. 1733, Inv. No. 701-TA-224 (Final) (July 1985).
The Commission made a negative determination concerning pork imports, and the
CIT affirmed the Commission's determination in National Pork Producers Council v.
United States, 661 F. Supp. 633 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
134. Live Swine, USITC Pub. 1733, at 13.
135. Id.
136. Alberta Pork Producers, 669 F. Supp. at 462.
137. Id. at 463.
138. Id.
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estimates used to make a determination on live swine imports
were derived from data on live swine alone, or were derived
from data covering both live swine and pork.1 39 Noting that
the Commission had found live swine and pork to be different
like products, the CIT held that if the latter were true, the esti-
mates would be inappropriate for use in making a determina-
tion as to live swine alone. 40 The CIT instructed the Commis-
sion on remand to determine on what data the estimates were
based. 4 ' If the estimates were based on both live swine and
pork data, then the Commission was to reconsider its determi-
nation and either collect new data or explain what existing data
in the record supported the determination.' 4 2
On remand, the Commission acknowledged that the elas-
ticity estimates were based on both live swine and pork data. 143
However, the Commission determined that the estimates were
the best information available within the meaning of 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677e(b) and again used the estimates in its determination
after adjusting them for any bias introduced by the data on
pork.' 4 The Commission again made an affirmative determi-
nation on live swine imports.' 45
The CIT subsequently affirmed the Commission's remand
determination."46 The plaintiff argued that the Commission
should not have relied on the elasticity estimates that were
based on live swine and pork, because new and better esti-
mates could have been developed during the remand proceed-
ing. 14 7 The CIT rejected this argument, finding that the Com-
mission could properly use the existing estimates once they
were adjusted for bias, particularly given the limited time avail-
able for conducting the remand investigation. 48
139. Id. at 464.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Live Swine and Pork from Canada, USITC Pub. 2108, Inv. No. 701-TA-224
(Final) (Remand) (Aug. 1988) at 5.
144. Id. at 3.
145. Id.
146. Alberta Pork Producers' Mktg. Bd. v. United States, 683 F. Supp. 1398,
1399 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
147. Id. at 1402.
148. Id. Plaintiff attacked the estimates on other grounds, but those grounds
had not been raised in the initial appeal and the CIT held them to be beyond the
scope of the remand. Id. at 1401-03.
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In sum, the CIT specifically approved the use of elasticity
estimates in material injury determinations, provided that the
elasticities relate to the specific product under investigation
and are based on substantial evidence of record. The CIT
noted, however, that "econometric estimates are not a substi-
tute for the overall assessment required by the statute, espe-
cially concerning impact of imports on the domestic producers
of like products."1 49
At roughly the same time as Alberta Pork was decided after
remand, Judge Carman issued his opinion in Copperweld Corp. v.
United States,'50 examining the use of an elasticity-based analy-
sis. The Copperweld case involved judicial review of the Com-
mission's final negative determination in Heavy-Walled Rectan-
gular Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Canada.15 1 In mak-
ing its determination, the Commission plurality15 2 considered
various factors, including the performance of the domestic in-
dustry with respect to production capacity utilization and prof-
itability. 153 In the section of its views dealing with these two
factors, the plurality cited to the hearing testimony of Dr. Rob-
ert A. Leone,154 who commented on the elasticity of supply in
the domestic industry and its effect on the industry's perform-
ance.
Dr. Leone testified before the Commission that he had ex-
amined the performance of the domestic heavy-walled rectan-
gular pipe and tube industry and the impact of the subject im-
ports from Canada. He believed the domestic industry to be
operating in the highly elastic portion of its supply curve, and
further found that the domestic industry was operating at a low
level of production capacity utilization. In Dr. Leone's view,
this should in theory mean that increases in production should
149. Id. at 1402.
150. 682 F. Supp. 552 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
151. USITC Pub. 1808, Inv. No. 731-TA-254 (Final) (Feb. 1986),
152. Chairman Stern, Vice Chairman Liebeler, and Commissioner Brunsdale is-
sued a joint plurality opinion. Commissioner Lodwick and Commissioner Rohr is-
sued a joint concurrence. Commissioner Eckes dissented. Id.
153. Id. at 5.
154. Dr. Leone was presented as a witness by a respondent in the investigation,
Titan Industrial Corp., which subsequently appeared in the case before the CIT as
defendant-intervenor. Id. at 12 n.27; see List of Witnesses Appearing at the Commis-
sioner's Hearing, id. at B- 1i.
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not lead to significant increases in price or profitability. '5 5 Dr.
Leone also testified that the domestic heavy-walled rectangular
pipe and tube industry was highly competitive, especially after
the entry of imports from Canada into the market, and that the
more competitive an industry is, the more elastic its supply
curve becomes.' 56 This in turn leads to downward pressure on
prices, pressures on productivity and wage restraints, low prof-
its, and stable or decreasing employment. 5 7 Dr. Leone con-
cluded that if these developments were to be observed, and
they would be expected to occur in the absence of Canadian
competition, imports from Canada would have neither created
nor intensified the competitive conditions of the market.' 5 8
The Commission plurality found, based on the record in
the investigation including Dr. Leone's testimony, that the do-
mestic industry was competitive and capital-intensive, and that
the industry's "short-run supply curve is highly elastic in the
relevant range."' 59 The plurality further found that increases
in domestic production and shipments had not led to signifi-
cant increases in industry profits.1 60 After an increase from
1982 to 1983, profitability had remained flat during the re-
mainder of the period of investigation. 6 ' The plurality ex-
plained this performance by the fact that the domestic industry
was operating at a low level of capacity utilization, suggesting
that an increase in demand for the domestic product would not
result in a significant short-run increase in domestic price.. The
plurality concluded that even were the imports to decline sub-
stantially and entirely to the benefit of the domestic industry,
capacity utilization would not increase enough to raise signifi-
cantly industry profits. 162
Upon review, plaintiffs took issue with several aspects of
the Commission's determination, including the plurality's con-
sideration in its causation analysis of the margin of dumping
155. Transcript of Commission Hearing at 35, cited in Copperweld Corp. v.
United States, 682 F. Supp. 552, 574 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
156. Id. at 35.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 30-32.
159. Heavy-Walled Rectangular Welded Carbon Steel Plates and Tubes from
Canada, USITC Pub. 1808, Inv. No. 731-TA-254 (Final) (Feb. 1986) at 12 n.27.
160. Id. at 11.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 11-12.
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found by the U.S. Department of Commerce.1 63 In particular,
plaintiffs put forward several arguments concerning Dr. Le-
one's testimony and the Commission plurality's reasoning
based on that testimony."6 Plaintiffs claimed that Dr. Leone
incorrectly analyzed conditions in the market, and contended,
in particular, that Dr. Leone improperly ignored demand for
the product.' 65 Further, they took issue with such statements
of his as that new entrants would take the market price rather
than undersell, and that price would not be significantly af-
fected by the elimination of the subject imports. 166
The CIT rejected plaintiffs' arguments, finding that Dr.
Leone's conclusions were fully supported by the condition of
the domestic industry as reported in the investigation rec-
ord. 167 Whether or not demand was an integral part of Dr.
Leone's analysis, the CIT found that the supply curve he had
postulated was borne out in practice.' 6 8 The CIT also found
that Dr. Leone's statement concerning new entrants was sup-
ported by evidence that purchasers of imports valued nonprice
factors such as delivery and service. 69 Finally, the CIT ac-
cepted Dr. Leone's statement that the imports' loss of market
share would not affect price as in accord with the record. 70
While the CIT in Copperweld did not squarely address a set
of parameters for the use of economic analysis, it is quite ap-
parent that the decision was rendered with the first Alberta Pork
decision in mind. Copperweld reflects the CIT's concern that
the elasticity estimate relied upon by the Commission be firmly
anchored in the information on the record of the specific inves-
tigation. More importantly, the CIT extensively compared the
economic analysis relied upon by the plurality with the evi-
dence relating to the enumerated statutory factors to justify its
use. 7 ' Accordingly, the two principles-that economic analy-
sis must be grounded in the present, product-specific record
163. Copperweld Corp. v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 552, 556 (Ct. int'l Trade
1988).
164. Id. at 573-75.
165. Id. at 573-74.
166. Id. at 574-75.
167. Id. at 573.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 574-75.
170. Id. at 575.
171. See id. at 573-75.
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and that it must not supplant the statute-were firmly rein-
forced by the CIT's analysis in Copperweld.
The CIT followed Alberta Pork and Copperweld with what has
been perhaps its most important statement on the use of elas-
ticities to date, the opinion of Judge Restani reviewing the
Commission's remand determination in USX Corp. v. United
States ("USX I1").172 The USX line of cases began with CIT
review of the Commission's final negative antidumping deter-
mination in Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Plates and Sheets from Argen-
tina.' 73 That determination did not involve the use of elastici-
ties and was remanded to the Commission on various grounds,
including inadequate investigation of lost sales allegations and
failure to seek recent foreign production capacity data. 174
In particular, the CIT remanded the case to the Commis-
sion on the issue of causation because of a perceived flaw in
the Commission's discussion of import penetration, which, as
is discussed below, is of particular relevance to the use of elas-
ticities. 75 The CIT remanded the case in part because the
Commission "failed to articulate any rational connection be-
tween low levels of market penetration by Argentine imports
and its final negative determination."'' 76 In its determination,
the Commission had stated that the level of market penetration
achieved by the subject imports remained low during the pe-
riod of investigation, and concluded that the domestic industry
had not been materially injured by reason of such imports.
The CIT found this to be insufficient as an explanation of the
Commission's determination, stating that the Commission
must be guided by the significance of a quantity of imports and
not absolute volume alone. 77
In USX Corp. v. United States ("USX 1,"), 17 8 the CIT quoted
from the legislative history of the Trade Agreements Act of
1979 a statement to the effect that an apparently small volume
of imports may affect one industry significantly, while the same
172. 682 F. Supp. 60 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
173. USITC Pub. 1637, Inv. No. 731-TA-175 (Final) (Jan. 1985). Chairwoman
Stern, Vice Chairman Liebeler, and Commissioners Lodwick and Rohr issued a joint
plurality opinion. Id. Commissioner Eckes dissented. Id.
174. USX Corp. v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 487 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
175. Id. at 490.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 655 F. Supp. 487 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
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volume might not so affect another industry.'79 The CIT
noted that the Commission in the past had recognized that the
effect of imports on the cold-rolled steel industry could not be
evaluated by looking only at import volume, in view of the in-
herent price sensitivity and fungibility of the product.' 80 The
CIT pointed to one investigation in which the Commission had
based an affirmative determination on an import penetration
roughly one half the level involved in USX I, and had stated
that small import volumes of cold-rolled steel products can
have a magnified effect in the marketplace.''
In its determination on remand, the Commission again
found that the domestic industry was neither experiencing nor
was threatened with material injury by reason of the subject
imports. 8 2 Each commissioner issued his or her own individ-
ual views. Chairman Liebeler based her negative causation
finding on her frequently used analysis of five factors enumer-
ated in her views in Certain Red Raspberries from Canada. 18 3 Com-
missioner Lodwick conceded that under certain market condi-
tions even a small import penetration could have a significant
adverse effect on the domestic industry." 4 He stated, how-
ever, that market conditions such as a large growth of domestic
demand and the passivity of import pricing behavior showed
that the imports were not a cause of material injury to the do-
mestic industry."" Commissioner Rohr also based his nega-
tive causation finding on an analysis of import penetration in
the light of growing demand, and argued that the instant case
was distinguishable from the Spanish Steel investigation cited by
the CIT because the domestic industry had been worse off in
that case and because Spain, unlike Argentina, was a new and
aggressive supplier of cold-rolled steel products to the United
179. H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1979) (quoted in USX Corp.,
655 F. Supp. at 490).
180. USX Corp. v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 487, 490 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
181. Id. (citing Certain Carbon Steel Products from Spain, USITC Pub. 1331,
Inv. Nos. 701-TA-155, 157, 158, 159, 160, & 162 (Final) (Dec. 1982) at 16-17 (View
of the Commission)).
182. Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Plates and Sheets from Argentina, USITC Pub.
1967, Inv. No. 731-TA-175 (Final) (Remand) (March 1987).
183. Id. at 14-23 (citing Certain Red Raspberries, USITC Pub. 1680, Inv. No. 731-
TA-196 (Final) (June 1985) at 11-19 (Additional Views of Vice Chairman Liebeler)).
184. Id. at 49-50.
185. Id. at 50.
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States. 86 Commissioner Eckes dissented from the majority's
negative determination, as he had in the initial investigation. ' 8 7
Vice Chairman Brunsdale made a negative determination.
She began her opinion by adopting the Commission's prior de-
terminations, which were not questioned by the CIT, that the
like product was cold-rolled carbon steel plates and sheets,
that the domestic industry was all producers of the like prod-
uct, and that the domestic industry was experiencing material
injury.'88 On the issue of causation, however, she used an
analysis based on elasticity estimates. The Vice Chairman ex-
amined the levels of market penetration achieved by the sub-
ject imports from Argentina, which ranged from .8% to .9% of
the U.S. market, and found the levels to be "relatively
small."' 89 She also looked at the weighted average margin of
dumping reported by the U.S. Department of Commerce,
which was 122.3%, and found it to be "very high."'90
Vice Chairman Brunsdale stated that for purposes of her
analysis, she would assume that the subject imports from Ar-
gentina had their price reduced by the entire amount of the
dumping margin. She noted that this assumption probably
overstated the adverse effect of the subject imports on the do-
mestic industry, because it was unlikely that the entire margin
would be passed through to the imports. Having made the as-
sumption, the Vice Chairman found that if imports had not
been dumped but had been sold at a fair price, the imports
would have been priced entirely out of the market. The result-
ing increase in demand for products from other sources would
then have benefitted domestic firms and importers from coun-
tries other than Argentina such as Brazil and Korea.' 9 '
However, the Vice Chairman assumed that all of the busi-
ness had gone to domestic firms, because she stated an inten-
186. Id. at 65.
187. Id. at 71 (dissenting views of Commissioner Eckes).
188. The Vice Chairman noted in her opinion that she had not been at the Com-
mission at the time of the initial determination. Id. at 26.
189. Id. at 26-27. These figures were calculated on a volume basis. Vice Chair-
man Brunsdale noted that she generally finds it more appropriate to analyze import
penetration on a value basis, but stated that in this case there was little difference
between the two measures. She stated that the import penetration level calculated
on a value basis would be .7%. Id. at 27 n.2.
190. Id. at 27.
191. Id. at 28.
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tion to find the upper bound for the effects of the subject im-
ports on the domestic industry. In this vein, she also assumed
that none of the subject imports would be present in the mar-
ket if priced fairly. She noted that demand for steel plates and
sheets, as intermediate products, is low to moderate, and cited
to a memorandum by Commission staff for a discussion of de-
mand elasticity.'9 2 By adding the volume of the subject im-
ports to the shipments of domestic firms, the Vice Chairman
calculated that the domestic industry could have increased its
shipments by one percent in the absence of less than fair value
sales. Alternatively, the dumped imports caused a reduction in
domestic shipments of one percent at most.19 3
Vice Chairman Brunsdale next determined an upper
bound for the suppressive effect of the subject imports on do-
mestic prices. For this determination, she used an estimate ob-
tained from the Commission's Office of Economics of the price
sensitivity of domestic supply, or the elasticity of supply,
which, she noted, "other things remaining the same, is defined
as the percentage change in quantity supplied divided by the
percentage change in price."' 9" This, the "best estimate of
this price sensitivity," indicated that a one percent rise in the
price of the domestic product would lead to a 3.5% increase in
the quantity supplied by the domestic industry. 9 5 The Vice
Chairman concluded from this that if demand for the domestic
product increased by one percent, as would have occurred in
the absence of LTFV sales, the domestic price would increase
by .29%.'96 This last figure was derived by multiplying one
percent by the fraction 1/3.5.197 The Vice Chairman therefore
found that the subject imports could have depressed domestic
prices by at most .3%.198
Vice Chairman Brunsdale then calculated the maximum
amount by which the subject imports could have reduced the
domestic industry's sales. To do so, she added the reduction
in domestic shipments of one percent to the reduction in do-
192. Id. at 28-29 n.6 (citing Staff Memorandum, INV-K-029, at 24 n.3).
193. Id. at 29-30.
194. Id. at 29 n.8.
195. Id. at 29-30.
196. Id. at 30.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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mestic prices of .3%, and reached the amount of 1.3% as the
amount of lost sales that the domestic industry could have ex-
perienced by reason of the dumped imports. 9 9 Based on her
analysis, Vice Chairman Brunsdale found that the subject im-
ports could have had only a "very tiny" adverse effect on the
domestic industry, and concluded that such imports were not a
cause of material injury.20 0
On review of the Commission's first remand determina-
tion, the CIT again remanded the case. Although the CIT
found no fault with the individual commissioners' threat analy-
ses, the CIT questioned the handling of both the cumulation
and the causation issues. As to causation, the CIT focused on
only the views of Chairman Liebeler and Vice Chairman Brun-
sdale, finding fatal flaws in both opinions.2 0  The CIT then
rejected the Chairman's five-factor analysis as improperly re-
quiring predatory intent as a prerequisite to an affirmative de-
termination and assuming rational behavior on the part of im-
porters.20 2
The CIT took a less critical view of Vice Chairman Brun-
sdale's analysis. Although the CIT rejected the particular ap-
plication of that analysis in the subject determination, Judge
Restani stated that "this approach to causation analysis has the
potential for explaining, within the confines of the statutory
framework and in an improved manner, how less than fair
value imports affected the domestic industry. ' 20 3 As the CIT
noted, Alberta Pork had already approved the use of elasticity
199. Vice Chairman Brunsdale noted that certain commissioners use the term
"lost sales" to refer to the anecdotal data in the "lost sales" section of the staff re-
port. She stressed the difference between that view and her own, because she does
not generally find the anecdotal data to be probative on the issue of causation. Id. at
30-31.
200. Id. The Vice Chairman, as did the other commissioners, also discussed the
issues of cumulation and threat which were remanded by the CIT. Those discussions
do not involve the use of elasticities and are beyond the scope of this Article. Id. at
31.
201. The CIT did not discuss the approaches of Commissioner Lodwick and
Commissioner Rohr, finding that it would be "poor judicial economy" to examine
them, because, without the Chairman and the Vice Chairman, the two remaining
Commissioners did not constitute a majority. USX Corp. v. United States, 682 F.
Supp. 60, 63 n.3 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
202. Id. at 64-68.
203. Id. at 69.
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estimates to assist in the Commission's causation analysis. 2 4
USX II arguably goes further than Alberta Pork, however, in
that it suggests that the economic model-based approach may
be an improvement on more traditional types of analyses. USX
II also builds on Alberta Pork. In the earlier case, the CIT held
that the Commission need not establish the accuracy of elastic-
ity estimates to a scientific degree of accuracy. In USX II, the
CIT accepted this precept, but stated that if a commissioner
relies almost exclusively on such estimates, the CIT can re-
quire "that some threshold degree of reliability be established
in the record. 2 0 5
The CIT rejected the Vice Chairman's particular use of
the 3.5% supply elasticity estimate "because of the exclusive
reliance on an elasticity estimate which the determination does
not link to the specific facts of this case. ' 2 0 6 In so doing, the
CIT expressly contrasted the subject determination with the
elasticity analysis approved in Alberta Pork. In the latter case,
the Commission heard witnesses and accepted elasticity esti-
mates from both sides. The Commission chose to rely on a
range of estimates, recognizing the difficulty of obtaining a
precise figure. The CIT found that the expert testimony and
adversarial process helped assure the reliability of the esti-
mates used. In USX II, no parties were permitted to partici-
pate in the formulation of the elasticity analysis.
Moreover, the CIT questioned the source from which the
elasticity estimate was derived, expressing particular concern
about the age of the estimate and the data on which it was
based. While the investigation covered the period 1981 to
1984, the estimate was taken from a study published in 1981,
and was apparently based on data compiled between 1956 and
1976.207 In view of the changes in technology and other fac-
tors in the industry from 1956 to 1984, the CIT expressed
doubt that such an estimate based on old data could be used
reliably, particularly if the estimate controls the determination.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 69.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 70 (citing R. Crandall, Confidential Record Document Number (CR)
17, at 24 n.3 & 28 n. 1 (supplemental analysis by the Commission's Office of Ecomon-
ics)); see R. CRANDALL, THE U.S. STEEL INDUSTRY IN RECURRENT CRISIS, POLICY OP-
TIONS IN A COMPETITIVE WORLD (1981).
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The CIT also took issue with the use of an elasticity esti-
mate derived from the performance of the carbon steel indus-
try as a whole to analyze the performance of the cold-rolled
plates and sheets industry, which is only a segment of the car-
bon steel industry. The CIT could find no explanation in the
record for why such an estimate would be relevant, nor for why
the 3.5% estimate was chosen over the other estimates
presented in the record.2" 8 As in Alberta Pork, the CIT rejected
the use of an elasticity estimate that did not correspond to the
specific product under investigation.2 0 9
The CIT found the need for relevance to the subject prod-
uct to be particularly important in USX H because of the cen-
tral role played by the elasticity estimate in the Vice Chair-
man's determination. While in Alberta Pork the estimates were
only used in evaluating price effects, the estimate at issue in
USX H was used to derive both price effects and impact on the
domestic industry. The central importance of the estimate also
led the CIT to find that the Vice Chairman's assumptions in
favor of the domestic industry could not "save an analysis
flawed at its core. 210
The CIT also remanded the case for a further explanation
of the methodology Vice Chairman Brunsdale used to calcu-
late lost sales, a methodology which involved the equation
summing the Vice Chairman's estimate of reduction in domes-
tic shipments and her estimate of reduction in price. The CIT
stated that "[u]ntil such equations are accepted as the everyday
subject of antidumping decisions, however, they must be ex-
plained for the benefit of the parties and the court."'2 1 ' The
CIT suggested that it "would seem prudent" to relate such
equations to the facts of the individual investigation and to al-
low the parties to comment on it. 2 12
The CIT concluded that the views of the Vice Chairman
were "legally flawed and not based on substantial evi-
dence."2 3 Summing up the CIT's comments on those views,
we can discern several points of importance in the CIT's opin-
208. USX Corp. v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 60, 70 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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ion, which carefully build on and expand the Alberta Pork and
Copperweld decisions:
(1) The use of elasticities is permissible, and indeed may be
an improvement over more traditional approaches.
(2) A threshold showing of the elasticity estimate's reliabil-
ity must be made, particularly if the estimate is central to
the determination.
(3) The elasticity-based analysis must be expressly linked to
the facts of the individual investigation, and the elasticity
estimate must describe the product under investigation.
(4) The parties to the investigation must be permitted to
comment on the elasticity estimates.
(5) There must be an explanation of the equations and esti-
mates used, particularly if a choice has been made between
various estimates in the record.2. 4
Thus, rather than adopt a wholly new approach, the judge
in USX II apparently carefully expanded upon several elements
approved by other judges in the two earlier cases.
Soon after the issuance of Judge Restani's opinion, Judge
DiCarlo issued a decision in Maverick, which closely paralleled
its predecessor USX f.lY 5 Maverick involved review of the
Commission's preliminary negative determination in Certain
Line Pipes and Tubes from Canada.1 6
Commissioner Lodwick and Commissioner Rohr issued a
joint opinion, finding that the domestic industry exhibited im-
proving trends and that there was no reasonable indication
that the subject imports were either causing or threatening ma-
terial injury. Chairman Liebeler and Vice Chairman Brunsdale
each issued individual views, although both concurred, as did
Commissioner Eckes, in the views of Commissioner Lodwick
and Commissioner Rohr on the questions of like product and
domestic industry. The Chairman found that the record indi-
cated that the industry was materially injured, a conclusion in
which the Vice Chairman concurred. Chairman Liebeler based
her negative determination on a rebuttable presumption that
the subject imports could neither cause nor threaten material
injury, because the imports never captured even a 2.5% share
214. See id. at 68-70.
215. Maverick Tube Corp. v. United States, 687 F. Supp. 1569 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1988).
216. USITC Pub. 1965, Inv. No. 731-TA-375 (Preliminary) (Mar. 1987).
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of the U.S. market. While Vice Chairman Brunsdale based her
negative threat determination on such factors as foreign pro-
duction capacity and capacity utilization, she based her nega-
tive causation determination on an analysis which involved the
use of elasticity estimates.21 7
The Vice Chairman began her discussion of causation by
stating that she would focus on the level of market penetration
achieved by the subject imports and on the margins of dump-
ing alleged by petitioners.21t  She noted that the subject im-
ports had never made a large penetration into the U.S. market,
ranging from .7% to 1.1% of the market. She calculated an
average dumping margin of 44.3% by dividing the sum of Ca-
nadian prices by the sum of U.S. prices as alleged in the peti-
tion. 1 9
Vice Chairman Brunsdale then proceeded to her analysis
of elasticities, pointing out that she made certain assumptions
in this analysis which favored petitioners. She assumed that
the whole dumping margin is passed through to depress prices
in the United States. This assumption led her to the conclu-
sion that the absence of LTFV pricing would have priced the
subject imports out of the market, leaving the domestic indus-
try to reap the benefit of sales increased by the full amount of
the allegedly dumped imports' market penetration. She fur-
ther noted that her assumption ignored the possible inability
of domestic supply to "rise to the occasion" due to such fac-
tors as a strike against the domestic industry.220
The Vice Chairman explained that her petitioner-favoring
assumptions allowed her to calculate with some precision the
outer bound of the effect that the subject imports could have
217. Id. Chairman Liebeler's presumption that a 2.5% domestic market share is
insufficient to cause material injury was rebuttable by a showing that both domestic
supply and demand for the subject product is highly inelastic. Her approach there-
fore left the door open for the consideration of elasticities. Unlike Vice Chairman
Brunsdale's approach, however, Chairman Liebeler's presumption left to the parties
the task of estimating supply and demand elasticities. Since the parties did not make
a showing of supply or demand inelasticity, her opinion does not discuss actual elas-
ticity estimates.
218. As she had in her views in the USX I remand, the Vice Chairman cited for
background to the Office of Economics Memorandum, EC-J-010 (Jan. 7, 1986). Id. at
38 n.10.
219. Id. at 38-40.
220. Id. at 40-41.
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had on the domestic industry. Assuming, then, that domestic
sales would have increased in the absence of dumping by the
full amount of import penetration, she calculated that the pres-
ence of the allegedly dumped imports caused a drop of 1.9%
in domestic industry shipments.2 2'
She next calculated the suppressive effect of the subject
imports on domestic prices, using an estimate of the price sen-
sitivity of domestic supply (the elasticity of supply). To obtain
this estimate, she relied on the short-term supply elasticity of
approximately 3.5% for carbon steel manufacturing set out in
economic texts.222 She stated that this was a lower bound esti-
mate for line pipe, which would have an elasticity of at least
3.5%, and that the use of such a figure would give petitioners
the benefit of the doubt because it would suggest greater price
suppression by the subject imports. Using the estimate thus
obtained, she found that a one percent rise in price would lead
to a 3.5% increase in domestic supply. This meant that the
increase in demand of 1.9% that she had found would result
from the absence of dumping would raise domestic prices by
(1%/3.5%) x 1.9%, or .6%. In other words, the subject im-
ports suppressed domestic prices by .6%.
From her conclusions that allegedly dumped imports
could at most reduce domestic shipments by 1.9% and depress
domestic prices by .6%, Vice Chairman Brunsdale concluded
that the imports could have had, at a maximum, a negative ef-
fect on the domestic industry's sales of 2.5%, the sum of 1.9%
and .6%. She found that "the adverse effects of dumped im-
ports from Canada on the domestic industry were too small to
be a cause of material injury to that industry. ' 223
On review of the Commission's determination, the CIT in
Maverick remanded the case to the Commission on several
grounds. The CIT rejected Chairman Liebeler's rebuttable
2.5% market penetration presumption as based on an analysis
requiring predatory intent for an affirmative determination.
Specifically citing USX H, the CIT found predation analysis in-
appropriate in a dumping case. As to the views of Commis-
sioner Lodwick and Commissioner Rohr, the CIT remanded
221. Id. at 41.
222. See, e.g., R. CRANDALL, supra note 207.
223. Line Pipes, USITC Pub. 1965, at 43.
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the case for reconsideration of their handling of a lost sales
allegation. The CIT also remanded the case because of flaws it
perceived in Vice Chairman Brunsdale's elasticity analysis. 224
The CIT noted that the use of elasticity estimates had
been approved in USX II and Alberta Pork. The CIT stated,
however, that this approval was conditioned in USX II on a
threshold showing that the elasticity estimates used by the
Commission are reliable. The CIT pointed out that the same
3.5% domestic supply elasticity estimate which Vice Chairman
Brunsdale used in the investigation reviewed in Maverick was
rejected in USX II as unreliable and thus legally flawed. In
Maverick, the CIT listed the very same flaws found in USX II:
the lack of input from the parties, the age of the data underly-
ing the estimate, and the lack of a showing that an estimate for
the carbon steel industry as a whole is relevant to a segment of
that industry.225
The CIT similarly found in Maverick that no showing of
reliability had been made for the 3.5% estimate in the investi-
gation under review in that case. The CIT pointed out that, far
from supporting the use of the estimate in an investigation
concerning the pipe and tube industry, the text from which the
estimate was obtained warned that many conclusions based on
the behavior of the domestic carbon steel industry "cannot be
extended to the specialty steel industry. ' 226
The CIT also quoted from plaintiffs' brief a statement to
the effect that the line pipe industry is not the same industry as
the basic steel industry, but rather a customer of the jatter.
Thus, suggested the CIT in Maverick, there was even less
chance that the 3.5% elasticity estimate, derived from the per-
formance of the carbon steel industry, could be relevant to the
entirely separate line pipe industry, than in USX II, in which
the steel plates and sheets industry was a part of the carbon
steel industry. Citing Alberta Pork, the CIT rejected the elastic-
ity estimate since it did not describe the specific productunder
investigation. The CIT held that "[flollowing USX Corp., the
Court finds that the use of the 3.5% elasticity estimate in this
224. Maverick Tube Corp. v. United States, 687 F. Supp. 1569 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1988).
225. Id. at 1574-75.
226. Id. at 1575 (quoting R. CRANDALL, supra note 207, at 5).
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determination is not based on substantial evidence and is not
in accordance with law." '2 2 7
IV. APPLICATION OF THE DECISIONS AT THE
COMMISSION
While the majority of commissioners have not relied upon
elasticity analysis, those commissioners who do employ such
analytical tools in their determinations have had clear guidance
from the CIT and have modified their approaches accordingly.
For example, following her remand opinion in USX H, Vice
Chairman Brunsdale addressed the case law in Additional
Views in Internal Combustion Engine Forklift Trucks from Japan.228
Addressing the sources of the elasticity estimates used in this
investigation, the Vice Chairman made the following observa-
tions:
the Commission's Office of Economics now routinely
prepares and delivers to the Commission and the parties
prior to the hearing a detailed analysis and estimation (in
numbers or ranges) of the relevant elasticities that charac-
terize the aggregate forces at work in the industry under investi-
gation. This analysis is based on the Staff's thoughtful con-
sideration of the information then available in the record,
including producer, importer, and purchaser questionnaire
responses, telephone interviews, field work, and secondary
research. The parties are then given an opportunity at the
hearing and in their posthearing submissions to reply to
Staff's analysis and provide their own estimates for consid-
i~ration by the Commission.2 29
Thus, the Vice Chairman noted that the Commission staff had
adjusted the elasticity information she relied upon to address
various criteria developed in the cases: the estimates relating
to the industry under investigation are grounded in the evi-
dence of that investigation, and the parties are routinely af-
forded an opportunity to comment on the estimates.
Again, in Additional Views in Digital Readout Systems and
Subassemblies Thereoffor Japan,5 0 Vice Chairman Brunsdale indi-
cated that the elasticity analysis she employed was that ap-
227. Id.
228. USITC Pub. 2082, Inv. No. 731-TA-377 (Final) (May 1988).
229. Id. at 82 (emphasis added).
230. USITC Pub. 2150, Inv. No. 731-TA-390 (Final) (Jan. 1989) at 36 n.34.
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proved by the CIT in Alberta Pork, Copperweld, and USX H. She
pointed out that "[e]xplicit examination of the mechanism
through which the imports affect domestic producers of the like
product using simple elasticity analysis provides the degree of
insight into the Commission's reasoning process that Congress
sought when it amended the dumping statute."'2 3 1 In examin-
ing the elasticities in the digital readout market, the Vice
Chairman made clear that the elasticity ranges developed by
the staff related to information gathered in the course of the
investigation, particularly as to characteristics of demand, re-
lated to the like product in question, and had been subjected
to the test of party comment and argument.23 2 Similarly, in
Certain All-Terrain Vehicles from Japan,233 the Vice Chairman spe-
cifically indicated that her use of elasticities was in accord with
the CIT's decision in Copperweld.234 She then discussed in de-
tail how the elasticity estimates she relied upon took into ac-
count the comments of petitioner and respondents, weighing
carefully the arguments presented by respondents as to the
supply elasticity.235 Moreover, the Vice Chairman's views
make clear that the elasticities she relied upon relate specifi-
cally to all-terrain vehicles and are based upon the investiga-
tion-specific evidence.236
Those commissioners who criticize the use of elasticity
analysis have generally done so in the context of the legal tests
for their use developed by the CIT. For example, Commis-
sioner Eckes placed no reliance on the elasticity numbers in
Certain Brass Sheet and Strip from Japan and the Netherlands237 be-
cause of his concern that the "elasticity was derived in large
part from information concerning a product other than the
one under investigation. ' 238 Again, in Digital Readout Systems
and Subassemblies Thereoffrom Japan, Commissioner Eckes noted
that he did not rely on the elasticity estimates in reaching his
determination. 239 Based upon his questioning of staff at the
231. Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
232. See generally id. at 37-48.
233. USITC Pub. 2163, Inv. No. 731-TA-388 (Final) (Mar. 1989).
234. Id. at 41 n.7.
235. Id.
236. See generally id. at 41-48.
237. USITC Pub. 2099, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-379 - 380 (Final) (July 1988).
238. Id. at 28.
239. USITC Pub. 2150, Inv. No. 731-TA-390 (Final) (Jan. 1989) at 24 n.86.
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public briefing and vote in this investigation, Commissioner
Eckes expressed a number of concerns about the elasticity esti-
mates in light of such concerns as whether they specifically re-
lated to the products under investigation.240 Finally, Commis-
sioner Eckes, in remarks before the Conference on Economic
Issues and Trade Policy, discussed at length his general con-
cerns that elasticity analysis is difficult to conform to the stan-
dards enunciated by the CIT in Alberta Pork, Copperweld, USX II,
and Maverick.24 1 He observed that it was rare for the staff to
derive product-specific elasticities based on data from the
usual three-year period examined in Commission investiga-
tions, and that even where "the staff actually formulate esti-
mates based on data in the investigation record, the data are
usually insufficient to permit a reliable estimate. '2 42
Thus, the effect of even a limited application of stare deci-
sis is apparent from individual commissioner's treatment of the
role of elasticity analysis in Commission decision making.
Clearly, there is disagreement over the applicability of such
analysis to Commission determinations. This debate, how-
ever, is not focused on the appropriate standard or legality of
using elasticity estimates. Rather, the disagreement is
grounded on whether such analyses can satisfy the tests that
have emerged through careful, cohesive decision making by
the CIT.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing discussion, we are able to draw several
conclusions concerning the application of stare decisis by
judges of the CIT in antidumping and countervailing duty
cases.
Although [the CIT], when [considering] the unfair trade
laws, does not simply ignore the existence of the doctrine,
the opinions of the judges, evidence a strong belief that
flexibility and independence are of paramount importance
in deciding disputes arising out of the antidumping and
240. See id. at 24-26 (transcript of Commission hearing) (Jan 4, 1989).
241. Economic Illusions and Trade Remedies: An ITC Commissioner's Perspective, Speech
by A. Eckes (Apr. 15, 1988) (copy on file at the Fordham International Law Journal of-
fice).
242. Id. at 11-13.
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countervailing duty laws.2 43
The second case study demonstrates that while the doctrine of
stare decisis does have some role in subsequent decisions of
the CIT, the force of that doctrine is not clear, with the judges
themselves apparently disagreeing on what that role should
be.2 44
From the perspective of the agencies, the absence of cer-
tainty in the administration of the law illustrated by the effects
of Yuasa II is a compelling argument for a stricter application
of stare decisis in subsequent decisions of the CIT. Admit-
tedly, it is difficult to argue that the opinions of various judges
of the CIT, whose decisions are appealable as of right, should
be absolutely binding on the CIT in future cases. However,
the benefits to be derived from greater adherence to precedent
deserve greater attention than has been given in the past. This
is especially true in light of the Federal Circuit's decision that a
ruling by the CIT may not be appealed as final, regardless of
the controlling issue of law it establishes, until the completion
of a remand by the agency.2 45
The denial by the Federal Circuit of an immediate appeal
as of right concerning a controlling issue of law, coupled with
the conflicting decisions of the CIT on frequently recurring
legal issues, has resulted in a highly problematic scenario for
the Commission in its administration of the antidumping and
countervailing duty laws. The difficulties arising from the ap-
pellate court's refusal to hear an appeal on an important issue
of law prior to the conclusion of a remand proceeding are seri-
ous from purely an agency perspective. They are exacerbated
when the agency, and individuals who appear before it, are
forced to engage in lengthy administrative proceedings with-
out any degree of certainty as to what the law will eventually
govern the outcome. Moreover, as the number of cases before
the CIT increases, it is imperative that stare decisis be applied
more frequently in the resolution of recurring issues in the an-
tidumping and countervailing duty area.2 46
243. Powell & Concannon, supra note 1, at 369.
244. Id. at 373.
245. See Cabot Corp. v. United States, 788 F.2d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1986);Jeannette
Sheet Glass Corp. v. United States, 803 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
246. Kennedy, Binational Dispute Settlement under the Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement,
13 MD.J. INT'L L. & TRADE 71, 100 (1988).
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This is not to say that the CIT should adopt a lockstep
approach to stare decisis. As noted at the outset of this Article,
the complexity of the antidumping and countervailing duty
laws and the "government relationships" implicated in their
administration preclude the rendering of CIT decisions in a
mechanical fashion. This need for flexibility, however, should
not vitiate the role of precedent, as certainly has been the case
in some instances. Moreover, the concerns of clarity and con-
sistency warrant that the balance tip more in favor of adher-
ence to precedent.
In sum, "[sitare decisis is ordinarily a wise rule of action. But
it is not a universal, inexorable command." '24 7 The CIT must
retain flexibility, but at the same time lend a degree of predict-
ability to the law. As the cases relating to the use of economic
analysis demonstrate, the CIT has achieved this delicate bal-
ance in the analysis of a very complex question in Commission
practice. By carefully taking into account other decisions on
the question, the judges of the CIT have demonstrated that the
necessary element of consistency in the interpretation of the
trade laws can be achieved without the adoption of mechanistic
approaches.
247. Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 238 (1924) (Brandeis,J.,
dissenting).
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